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European Disintegration: Tendencies of
Renationalization within the European Union and its
Impact on the CommonLaborMarket and EUConsumer
Markets
Thomas Köllen, Vienna University of Economics and Business
Administration, Austria
Abstract: Starting in 1952 with Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, andWest Germany
as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Union (EU) successively enlarged
to 27 member states in 2011. Since 2004, 10 Eastern European countries have joined the EU and, at
the time of writing, five countries still have official EU candidate status and may join the EU in the
near future. The permanent enlargement of the EU has led, and continues to lead, to social, cultural,
economic, and linguistic pluralization and heterogenization and, more and more, causes a feeling of
alienation among EU citizens. This comes along with a reduced willingness to share power, labor,
and money among EU states, provokes tendencies of renationalization, and the resurgence of national
thinking and acting. In the European common labor market these tendencies are attended by emerging
exclusive nationalistic working climates and therefore undermine the formal freedom of movement for
workers within the EU. In the European markets for consumer products (especially for food) these
tendencies are reflected in augmented efforts that are undertaken to accentuate the national origin of
domestic products. Empirical data of several EU member states will be analyzed and discussed. As a
case study, the actual nationalistic tendencies of the Austrian consumer market will be parsed and
integrated in a broader European picture.
Keywords: EU Enlargement, Renationalization, Labor Market, Consumer Markets, European Union,
Nationalism, Austria, Europe
Introduction
AFTER THE ACCESSION of ten new member countries to the EU since 2004, itseems that the willingness among the European states and citizens to deepen theEuropean integration has massively declined. In fact, quite the opposite seems to
be true. European politics more andmore are characterized by emphasizing different
“national” interests. Politicians can earn political points in their home-countries when they
create the impression they have “won” against or in Brussels. Furthermore, nationalistic and
exclusive tendencies are observable within the national labor markets of the EU. This article
will outline the situation in the UK, Ireland, Spain and Italy and discuss the consequences
for the common European labor market through the theoretical lenses of different approaches
to European integration. As a second path of analyzing Europe’s emerging nationalisms, its
impact and exemplary mode of operation on the national consumer markets are analyzed.
For the European Union, the Austrian market is a good example because Austria unites two
different streams of nationalistic polarization and self–aggrandizement. The first stream is
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the polarization against, mainly, Turkey, the Arabian countries and the Eastern European
countries. One important voice of that stream is the right-wing party, FPÖ (Freedom Party
of Austria), and its offshoot, BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria). In the actual opinion
poll of July 2011, 31% of the Austrian votes would make them the leading party (Gallup
2011). In the European Parliament, the FPÖ together with, amongst others, the French “Front
National” and the Italian “Alternativa Sociale” was a founding member of the political group
“Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty” (ITS). Compared to the other European right-wing parties,
the FPÖ has had, and still has, by far the biggest political heft in its home country (Almeida,
2010). The second stream of nationalistic self–aggrandizement in Austria is the polarization
against Germany. As an element of a politically intended formation of a “new” Austrian
identity, this stream was and to some extent still is supported by Austrian mass media and
Austrian politics and pervades all political factions, and therefore does not fit into a political
left–right scale (see e.g. Godeysen, 2010; Utgaard, 1999; Ritter, 1992). This situation in
Austria provokes resistance against both a proceeding European integration and enlargement.
The Austrian consumer market therefore reflects the twomainsprings of European tendencies
of renationalization.
The European Union
Drawn from a historical perspective, there can be deduced 5 imperatives that have been
constitutive for the process of European integration and European enlargement in different
emphases (Spohn, 2000). The historical basis of these imperatives is Europe’s loss of former
hegemonic power in the world over the course of its nationalistic and totalitarian self-destruc-
tion in two world wars. As first imperative, Spohn (2000) describes the domestication of the
self-destructive nationalistic potential by forming a common European peace—and security
system that also shields smaller states from possible claims of power of bigger states. The
second imperative aims at the overcoming of totalitarian and dictatorial emperies by estab-
lishing a democratic legal system and guaranteeing human rights and the protection of
minorities. The third imperative of the European integration and enlargement aims at the
supporting of a competitive economic development as the basis of societal prosperity and
wealth in democratic freedom. The fourth imperative is related to the third one and aims at
the recovery of a global position of power by bundling and using the resources of the European
states. This leads to the fifth imperative, the premise that principally every European country,
as long as it wants to, can be a legitimate part of the European integration project (Spohn,
2000: 222). Watching all of the European constitutive as well as the more specific treaties
signed until now in the process of European integration, it becomes obvious that the goal
setting or motivation for every single contract follows at least one of these imperatives.
The starting point for the European Union was the constitution of the European Coal and
Steel Community in 1952. With the treaty of Paris, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands,
France, Italy and (West) Germany agreed to establish a common market for their coal and
steel industry without internal tariffs and a common external tariff. With the treaty coming
into force, the “International Authority for the Ruhr” was abolished. From 1949 until then,
it controlled the coal and steel industry of the German Ruhr Area. In 1957, the six states
signed the treaty of Rome. The first part of the treaty was the constitution of the European
Atomic Energy Community, coordinating the Member States’ research and development
activities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The second part of the treaty of Rome was
118
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANIZATIONS,
COMMUNITIES AND NATIONS
the establishing of the European Economic Community (EEC) with the objective to create
a common market for the six founding members. In 1967 the Brussels treaty united the tree
institution under the umbrella of the EEC. From 1952 until 1973 the six founding states went
along the way of European integration alone. With the first enlargement in 1973, Denmark,
Ireland and the United Kingdom acceded to the EEC. Greece joined it in 1983 and Portugal
and Spain in 1986. After the reunification of Germany, East Germany became part of the
EEC as part of Germany. These twelve members of the EEC in 1993 signed the treaty of
Maastricht, founding the European Union (EU) that took over the functions of the EEC. In
1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the Union. In 2004, the EU was enlarged by
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia,
and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania acceded to the EU in 2007. Croatia will join the EU in
2012 and Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey have an official candidate status for
the EU and are still negotiating about their accession. Albania and Serbia applied for EU
membership and Norway twice conducted referendums that opposed a membership (see e.g.
Thorhallsson & Rebhan, 2011).
The enlargement is attended by a continuing social, cultural, economic, and linguistic
pluralization and heterogenization of the European Union. Figure 1 provides an overview
on the history of EU enlargement and its impact on the average gross domestic product
(GDP) of the EU. It becomes obvious that every step of enlargement (except in 1995) has
meant a descent of the average GDP because usually the new member states had a weaker
economy than the average EU member–states. This does not necessarily mean that every
round of enlargement signified a lowering of life standards of the previous EUmember–states
but almost every enlargement lead to transfer payments from the old to the new member
states.
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Figure 1: The Enlargement of the European Union, (Source: Eurostat)
Due to the fact that almost every single country of Europe has its own official language, the
EU enlargement led and still leads to a continuing linguistic pluralization of the union. With
27 members, the EU in 2011 has 23 official languages that are used for EU business. Only
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus and Luxemburg share their official language(s) with other countries.
Because of its crucial role for territorial identity formations, this linguistic diversity can be
seen as a crucial brake shoe for the formation of a European identity or a European citizenship
(see e.g. Blommaert & Verschueren, 1992; Hautefeuille, 2011; Kraus, 2008). Beyond that,
the linguistic differentiation within the EU promotes the strengthening of national mass
media and therefore hinders the formation of a European media-driven public (Maier &
Rittberger, 2008). The failure of “Euronews”, as one attempt to create a European news
channel that transmits in various languages, and thus could create a European public, shows
the strength of the monolingual national TV stations (de Vreese, 2007; Garcia-Blanco &
Cushion, 2010; Hurrelmann, 2008; Peter & de Vreese, 2004). On the level of community
law, the European multilingualism causes some problems when it comes to the national
translations of European directives into national law (Taylor, 2011). Language and culture
are two strongly linked phenomena (Caglar, 2007). Cultural diversity on the one hand can
be seen as the unifying common basis of the European Union, but on the other hand can be
the breaking point when national identities become predominant and exclude alternate anchors
of identification (Pit’ha, 2009). Excluding a common language and defining culture as based
on shared values, Zivko (2006) finds that nevertheless a process of cultural harmonization
is observable within the EU. But a proceeding cultural convergence does not directly implicate
a proceeding common identity.
Beside the mere enlargement, the integration of the European Union also continues and
more and more competences are transferred from the national to the European authorities.
Starting as a pure economic union, the European integration more and more points to a
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political union. Nevertheless, the highest degree of European integration still is reached on
the economical level. First of all the idea of a common and single market has become reality
for the European Union. The European internal market is based on four freedoms: the free
movement of goods, the free movement of capital, the free movement of services and the
free movement of people within the EU. Furthermore the European customs union stands
for the application of a common external tariff for goods and services entering the common
market and for the abolishment of all internal tariffs and restrictions. A next step of economic
integration was the monetary union with the creation of the Eurozone and the introduction
of a common currency in up to now 17 EUmember states (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain). In the context of the actual economic crisis in some
South–European members of the Eurozone again a probable next step of integration is dis-
cussed on a political level: a fiscal union (Darvas, 2010; Hallerberg, 2011; König & Zeyne-
loglu, 2010).
The social and political integration of the European Union happens for example in the
field of higher education through the Erasmus students exchange program and the general
aim to create a European Higher Education Area, often labeled as “Bologna Process”. An
important step of integration also was the creation of the Schengen–Area, an agreement that
aims at the abolition of physical borders. In 2011 all EU member states bar Great Britain
and Ireland are part of that area within their borders usually passport controls are abolished.
Furthermore there are a lot of other European integration projects for example in the area
of space and military (Kaiser, 2011; Keutel, 2011; Nello, 2002; Scharpf, 2010).
The whole process, that can be described as different intensities and layers of European-
ization, provokes and provoked different degrees and intensities of euroscepticism or euro-
cynicism all over the EU (see e.g. Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011;
Dixon, 2010; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Elgun & Tillman, 2007; Flood, 2009; Gabel &
Palmer, 1995; Gerritsen & Lubbers; Hix, 2007; Hooghe &Marks, 2005, 2009; Jones & van
der Bijl, 2004; Krouwel & Abts, 2007; Lobo & Magalhaes; Loveless; Lubbers & Jaspers,
2011; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005, 2007; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010; Ruzza, 2009; Vasilo-
poulou, 2009; Vida, 2008).
European Integration, Disintegration and Identity Formation
Until now only a few attempts have been undertaken to theorize European integration, and
therefore offering theoretical links as explanations for the conditions of a continuing and
unifying integration or even for a falling apart.
One direction of theoretical framing can be found in the theories of empire–formation and
the phenomenon of imperial overstretches (Kennedy, 1987). A crucial issue of that perspective
would be the discussion and analysis of the capacities of the administration in Brussels to
“reign” the enlarging “empire”. This approach can be supported by the findings that the en-
largement of the European territory and thus the mere extension of the distances between
its borders strongly undermine its cohesion (Berezin &Diez–Medrano, 2008; Clark & Jones,
2008). Enlarging in general thus means an enhancement of the danger of disintegration.
Another theoretical approach to European integration is the concept of communitarianism
(Etzioni, 2001). According to that the biggest danger that threatens the European integration
is its character of only being and remaining a “halfway–integration” in terms of different
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degrees of integration in different policy areas combined with the fact that the different
member–states are on different integration levels itself. Against this background and indic-
ating lack of a common basis of shared values and the lack of the availability of a common
“arena” to discuss these potential values Etzione (2001) concludes that “moving from 15 to
27 nations may well be enough to severely threaten any supranational community already
developed” (Etzioni, 2001 cited in Vollaard, 2008: 11). Vollaard (2008) adds for consideration
“The increase in socio–cultural heterogeneity may foster a sense of alienation among the
citizens in the EU. That makes citizens nostalgic for their place (regional or national) where
they find more homogenous values” (Vollaard, 2008: 11).
Looking at the national levels the process of European Integration can be described as a
permanent construction and reconstruction of national interests, political institutions and
collective identities of every single national state in its aggregation and in its relation to the
European Union (McLaren, 2002; Spohn, 2000). These processes of construction and recon-
struction also surrounded every round of EU enlargement but there is a substantial difference
that distinguishes the enlargements before 2004 from the Eastern European enlargements
that goes beyond the impact of the mere linguistic, economical, social and cultural pluraliz-
ation and diversification of the union. Jacques Delors, the former president of the European
commission, therefore estimated the probability that the EUEast–enlargement is the beginning
of a process of European disintegration to be 50% (Vollaard, 2008).
Until the fall of the Berlin wall and the breakdown of the bipolar world order of the cold
war the construction of “West–Europe” was an essential and important factor for the social,
political and territorial cohesion and therefore for the cultural consolidation of the European
Union. But with the fall of the iron curtain the growing convergence between the old EU
member states was confronted by the idea of enlarging the Union to Eastern Europe.
Therefore for the “Western” European states the centripetal forces of integration and deep-
ening the common basis of the Union is diametrically opposed by the centrifugal forces of
enlargement (Karp & Bowler, 2006; Spohn, 2000). This polarization is intensified by the
fundamental ambivalence of the Eastern European countries towards the European integration:
On the one hand the European Union, perceived as a new supranational power of the
“Western” European states in Brussels, seems to take away or at least to question their just
achieved national sovereignty. On the other hand the secular, political and economic per-
spectives of modernization that are connected with the European Union were very attractive
and in the end made them join the EU (Christin, 2005; Cichowski, 2000; Jackson, Mach, &
Miller–Gonzalez, 2011; Lyons, 2007; Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2006; Tanasoiu &
Colonescu, 2008; Vetik, Nimmerfelft, & Taru, 2006). But still their perceived price they
paid for accession to some extent is the loss of traditional national fundaments. On the
political level this ambivalence became evident when in 2007 at the negoziations for the
European constitution Lech Kaczynski, the former president of Poland, pushed through that
the definition of the European hymn (“Ode to joy” from Beethoven) and the definition of
the European flag (12 golden stars on blue ground) had to be removed from the treaty. Fur-
thermore the name of the treaty had to be changed from “European Constitution” into “Reform
Treaty” (now it is usually referred to as the “Treaty of Lisbon”). For the last negoziations
he had with the German chancellor Angela Merkel on that issue Kaczynski was openly
supported by the President of the Czech Republic and more covertly by most of the other
heads of the Eastern European states (Lewis, 2010). Something that on the first appearance
seems to be negligible, especially when that compromise made him agree to the new voting
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system and voting weights of the union, in fact means the removal of the three most powerful
anchors of a possible future European identity of European citizens. Also when the removal
does not inevitably mean that the “career” of the European flag and hymn comes to an end,
it reveals the unwillingness of the Eastern European states to let Europe replace them as
perceived home country of their citizens. On the symbolic level (flag, hymn, constitution)
they therewith implicate the other EU member states as well.
The phenomenon of “European identity” can be understood as formed by European integ-
ration. The emergence and development of a European identity systematically can be con-
ceptualized as an overlay (Eder, 1999) or an replacement (Lepsius, 1999) of national identities.
Imaginable is also an “as–well–as–identity” but usually territorial identities usually need
one main anchor, in this case the nation or the EU. Taking both territorial concepts as con-
tingent and replaceable, identity constructions that equally refer to both question the whole
concept of territorial identities. Maybe that can interpreted as the “perspective of belonging”
of a post–national constellation of a future Europe or world (Habermas, 1998), but in the
actual Europe national identities are still predominant. Data of the EU Eurobarometer support
that view. Periodically in all the EU–member states representative samples of citizens are
asked “In the near future do you see yourself as…?”. The five categories of responses are
(Nationality) only, (Nationality) and European, European and (Nationality), European only,
do not know. For the six founding members of the EU figure 2 and figure 3 show a time
series of the share of people that see themselves as only Europeans and or as only nationals.
“In the near future do you see yourself as (Nationality)?”
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“In the near future do you see yourself as European only?”
Figure 2 and 3: To be Nationality European in the Future? (in %), (Source: Question 40,
Eurobarometer of the European Commission)
Figure 2 indicates the considerable increase of people who see themselves only as nationals
in 2004, the date the EU–enlargement to the east. Figure 3 mainly shows the generally low
share of Europeans that see themselves only as Europeans. The only exception is Luxemburg.
Beside these mere numbers there are more indicators and symptoms of arising nationalistic
tendencies and nationalisms observable in Europe. One symptom is the recent accumulation
of nationalistic incidents on the European labor markets and another one is the emerging
tendency to come back to nationalistic consumer behaviors. Both is exemplified and discussed
in the next.
Nationalism and the European Labor Market(s)
After the enlargement in 2004 a large–scale emigration from Poland and the Baltic States
to Great Britain and Ireland took place. After and also already before joining the EU in 2007
there was a second big European wave of emigration from Romania and Bulgaria to Italy
and Spain.
The Case of Polish Migrants in the UK and Ireland
In 2006 between 5% and 7% of the Polish labor force worked outside Poland (Kaczmarczyk,
2008). Before 2004 Germany was by far the most important European target country for
Polish workers at which the immigration and naturalization of 1.4. million so–called “ethnic
Germans” between 1950 and 2002 is not taken into account, i.e. people of German descent
who before the new demarcation of Germany`s and Poland`s borders after World War II
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lived in the former German territories (Kaczmarczyk & Okólski, 2005; Pallaske, 2001;
Wedel, 1992). In 2000 there lived 76.700 Poles in Great Britain and 327.000 in Germany
whereas in 2004 410.000 Poles were living in Great Britain compared to 300.000 in Germany
(Kaczmarczyk, 2008; Rock & Wolff, 2002).
Between 2004 and 2007 about 66% of the immigrants that came from the new EUmember
states to the UK came from Poland. Irish data confirms these tendencies. Between 2004 and
2007 about 200.000 new Polish immigrants were counted, representing 56% of all immigrants
from the new EUmember states (Grabowska–Lusińska, 2007, 2008). Compared to the Polish
immigrants coming to Germany that completely has opened its labor market for the new EU
member states as recently as May 2011 (Gerhards & Lengfeld, 2009; Krings, 2009), the
immigrants in Great Britain are younger and possess higher levels of qualification. But
compared to the average workforce in Great Britain the Polish immigrants get much lower
returns to their qualification (Drinkwater, Eade, & Garapich, 2009). By directly opening
their labor markets for the new EU members without any restrictions the United Kingdom,
Ireland and Sweden sent a clear welcoming signal that sets them apart from all the other
“old” EU member states. But fired up by the economic and financial crisis, that started in
2007 and especially strong affected the UK and Ireland, the seemingly inclusive working
climate for workers from the Eastern European countries changed. Primarily in the industrial
sector more and more examples came up for overtly hostile and exclusive climates.
A starting point was the case of an oil refinery in North Killingholme in North Lincolnshire
that is operated by the French company Total. In January of 2009 the company decided to
place the order for the construction of a desulfurization installation at IREM SpA, an Italian
construction company. The announcement of IREM solely to employ Italian and Portuguese
contract workers caused a walkout of the British employees of the refinery and provoked a
wave of national protest and solidarity among the British workers of other plants all over
the UK. Within a few days in more than 20 different refineries and power plants the workers
organized walkouts and protest rallies and the focus of protest in most of the plants switched
to the Polish workers or the workers and colleagues from Eastern Europe in general that
now more openly were perceived and labeled as competitors on a labor market where jobs
are getting scarce. An often used slogan was “British jobs for British workers”, a quotation
of a speech of the former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown from 2007. The media re-
ferred to these events for several weeks as the “Lindsey Oil Refinery strikes” (Barnard, 2009;
Castles & Vezzoli, 2009).
Heated by the economic crisis and the rising rate of unemployment in the country also in
Ireland an upcoming animus against the newmigrants can be stated. Konics (2009) illustrates
this atmosphere with the statement of a Polish woman in Ireland: “Latterly I permanently
get questioned by Irish people where I am coming from. There resonates a strong and
non–suppressed aggressiveness in that questioning. I am more and more fed up with that
and I would like to bawl at these people and say them they shouldn’t care a rat–fuck about
it. But I control myself and deny myself such responses.” (Konicz, 2009: 3).
The Case of Romanian Migrants in Italy and Spain
The second biggest Eastern European country that joined the EU in 2007, 3 years after Poland,
is Romania. Until 2011 an estimated 1.6 million Romanians emigrated or legalized their
residence into other European countries (Martínez, 2011). For the wave of Romanian
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emigration that started in 2002 and abated in 2008 Spain was by far the most popular destin-
ation, followed by Italy (Ban, 2009; Sandu, Radu, Constantinescu, & Ciobanu, 2004). 50%
of the migrants chose Spain as target country and about 25% Italy. Whereas in 1998 about
3.500 Romanians were registered in Spain (Viruela–Martínez, 2002) in the end of 2009 there
lived 800.000 Romanians in the country (Martinez, 2011). Being amongst others attracted
by the economic growth of the Spanish economy the situation totally changed since 2008.
With a quota of more than 20% Spain in May 2011 has the highest rate of unemployment
in Europe and the rate of unemployment within the Romanian population in Spain is even
higher than the average Spanish quota. In 2008, the government of Romania started campaigns
in several Spanish cities that promised their countrymen support and employment in Romania
aiming at convincing them to return. In 2009 the Spanish government cooperated with the
Romanian government and offered money for those Romanians who agree to leave the
country for at least three years, but only very fewRomanians accepted that offer (Campomori,
2010; Martínez, 2011). Over the last years, especially since the beginning of the economic
crisis and the rapid boost of the amount of unemployed people in Spain, the working climate
and generally the conditions of everyday–life for Romanians and other immigrants has
worsened. Because of the crisis the acceptance and tolerance that is shown to the immigrants
in Spain massively slumped (D’Ancona & Valles Martínez, 2008; Éltető, 2011). The stress
and the psychological problems caused by the experienced discrimination and everyday de-
motion is increasing among the Romanian population (Gonzalez–Castro & Ubillos, 2011)
and generally the Romanians are confrontedmore andmore with situations of public rejection,
especially in the workplace (Agudelo–Suárez et al., 2009; Porthé et al., 2011).
In Italy there are living about 400.000 immigrants that have Romanian citizenship.
(Martinez, 2011). The Romanian government started campaigns to convince the Romanian
emigrants to return to Romania in 2008 in Italian cities as well but also here the rate of ac-
ceptance was very low (Campomori, 2010; Martínez, 2011). The everyday–situation for the
Romanians in Italy differs a little from the situation in Spain because Italy has several ex-
amples of public hostilities and aggressions against the housing schemes of Romanian Sinti
and Romanies. These organized aggressions that in some cases had the character of pogroms
often were heated by one–sided local news coverage that found Sinti or Romanies guilty for
any actual crime. The Italian politicians quite often in the past avoided to take a tough stance
against these violence and racism and quite the contrary sometimes encouraged the aggressors
and showed sympathy for their behavior (Sigona, 2010). Also Romanians in Italy that have
not experienced that aggressions personally, know the images and know the stories about it
and know the destructive potential that is inherent in the softer types of exclusion they are
confronted with in their workplaces and in their everyday life. And therefore also they are
personally affected by these aggressions (Pavone, 2010; Uccellini, 2010).
Nationalisms and the EuropeanConsumerMarkets: The Case of Austria
For analyzing the interrelation of emerging nationalisms in the European Union and the
European consumer markets this paper points out the example of Austria. Austria is beside
the UK (Clements, 2009, 2010) the most eurosceptic country of the EU (Eurobarometer)
but in contrast to the UK it is part of all European steps of integration that are made until
now as for example the Eurozone and the Schengen–Area. Austria joined the EU in 1995
and has very close relations to Germany and to its bordering countries of South–Eastern
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Europe. Therefore it can be seen as a medium between the founding members and the new
member states that joined the union after 2004. Even though Austria does not have the
political clout to politically mediate or to build bridges between these EU member–groups
the situation in Austria reflects elements of both groups what makes its consumer market a
good European example. The shared historical, cultural and linguistic roots with Germany
make the Austrian nationalism and euroscepticism unique in Europe.With the end of National
Socialism and World War II Austria tried to wipe away the common ground with Germany
and one of the most important constitutive elements of the new Austrian identity–formation
became “not–to–be–German”. That came along with the social demotion of everything that
was perceived as German and with the national absorption and monopolization of what was
perceived as positive. One striking example is the renaming of the school subject “German”
into “Language” but these processes pervaded and to some degree still pervade all realms
of the Austrian society and everyday–life (Godeysen, 2010). This being the situation the
Austrian accession to the European Union for the Austrians equaled to some extent a polit-
ical moving together with Germany and therefore carried the inherent danger of questioning
the demarcation to Germany as one supporting pillar of Austrian identity. This connectivity
was revealed by a campaign of the Austrian government to convince the Austrian to agree
to the EU accession. The slogan of the campaign was “Sackerl bleibt Sackerl”. “Sackerl” is
the expression for “bag” in the Austrian–German dialect and the slogan tried to dispel the
preoccupation that the EU–accession will initiate a process that in the end will replace the
Austrian dialect by the High German that is spoken in Germany.
The situation of the Austrian retail market has at least partially to be interpreted against
that background, especially because it is dominated by German retailers. Themarket is highly
concentrated and the German Rewe–Group is the leading retailer with a marketshare of 31%
followed by the Austrian Spar holding a share of 28.4%. The third biggest retailer on the
Austrian market is the German discounter Aldi–Süd that has a market share of about 20%.
Another important retailer that predominantly is located in Vienna is Zielpunkt. The most
rapidly expanding supermarket in Austria is the German discounter Lidl holding an actual
market share of 3.8%. Lidl mainly is supplied by its German warehouses and for that had
to face massive “patriotic” criticism in Austria. At a protest rally of Austrian farmers in the
Austrian province of Carinthia the governor Dörfler publicly accused Lidl of “solely selling
crap” (Cik, 2009) and only “offering imported junk” and concluded that “no Carinthian
should buy there” (ORF, 2009). For analyzing the intensity of nationalism on the retail
market examples will be given of actual (July 2011) leaflets of Rewe, Spar and Zielpunkt.
Furthermore the presentation of the goods and the audio–visual merchandising and advertising
at the point of sale will be analyzed. The data was collected in June and July 2011 in Vienna.
The Spar–Group that mainly runs the retailing concepts Spar, Eurospar and Interspar in
its annual report (2010) describes itself as the only retailer running stores all over Austria
that is possessed only by Austrians, a couple of families. Beside the annual report this in-
formation, accompanied by the slogan “For us Austria comes first”, is communicated at
frequent intervals to the customers via the Spar–radio program that runs in every market.
An actual campaign of Spar that is placed in newspapers and leaflets transports the message:
“We are Austria: Priority for domestic quality” (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Spar–Slogan: “We are Austria: Priority for Domestic Quality”, July 2011
The Rewe–Group runs three different channels of distribution in Austria: the supermarket
“Billa”, the discounter “Penny Markt” and the superstore “Merkur”. For all of them they
introduced a common national labeling system in June 2011. They designed two symbols
to categorize the degree to what each product they sell is “Austrian”. Little tables all over
the markets explain these symbols to the customers (see figure 5). An Austrian flag (3 hori-
zontal stripes: Red–White–Red) with a single A stands for products with a value creation
that has been made for more than 50% in Austria. They explain “value creation” as the share
of the manufacturing cost and therefore exclude themargin between their selling and purchase
prices. A double–A is given to products that only contain ingredients from Austria and that
have a value creation of 100% in Austria. A footnote allows a tolerance limit of 2%. This
nationalistic campaign is intensified by posters that are placed in every Penny Markt that
say: “We are storage–rack–patriots, for us Austrian products come first” (see figure 6).
Figure 5 and 6: National Labeling at Billa/“Storage-rack-patriots”–Campaign at PennyMarkt,
July 2011
At the storage–racks of the Rewe–markets every single product that fits into the categories
of A or AA is labeled with the adequate symbols. This labeling includes all product groups.
Figures 7, 8 and 9 give examples of infant–food at Penny Markt and noodles and sanitary
tampons at Billa.
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Figure 7, 8 and 9: Product Labeling in Penny Markt and Billa, July 2011
The third supermarket chain where data is taken from is Zielpunkt. Zielpunkt labels every
product that is Austrian in its leaflets as well as at the point of sale with an Austrian flag and
the slogan “quality from Austria”. Three examples for the labeling at the point of sale are
shown in figures 10 to 12 and one example for the leaflet is figure 13.
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Figure 10, 11 and 12: Product Labeling at Zielpunkt, July 2011
Figure 13: Product Labeling in a Zielpunkt–leaflet, July 2011
PennyMarkt as well as the retailer Zielpunkt is supplied by Schirmhofer an Austrian butchery.
Within Zielpunkts leaflets Schirmhofer usually has an own space for its advertising because
in many Zielpunkt chain stores it runs own selling points. For emphasizing the Austrian
origin of their meat they developed a label that’s says in front of the Austrian flag “100%
Österrein” and subtitles “guaranteed meat from Austria” (see figure 14).
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Figure 14: Schirnhofer Advertizing, July 2011
“Österrein” is a wordplay of Austria (Österreich) and purity or pureness (Reinheit). In German
“Reinheit” has a meaning of being “clean” and not being mixed together with other things
that harm the pureness or cleanness. Using it as a national labeling for food it has a very
strong connotation of heavily devaluating “dirty” foreign products or foreign elements of
Austrian products. It provokes the association of giving to the product a genetically code in
which the Austrian part is the good one. In considering the Rewe labeling of “A” and “AA”,
there could be drawn a connection to blood types and the idea of an Austrian “pure
bloodedness” or an Austrian “purity of breeding”.
Summary and Conclusion
The tendencies of renationalization within Europe confront the widespread assumption that
the national state more and more is an obsolescent model in the “modern” or “postmodern”
world (Beck & Grande, 2004). The dialectic approach that historically describes the process
of nation building as a process of becoming a cosmopolitan citizen by continuously drawing
bigger units of unification seems to be contrasted by actual politics (Etzioni, 2001; Popov,
2002). Also the imagination that peoples increasingly share their individual solidarity with
concrete people instead of institutionalized communities (Appiah, 2006) like nations seems
not to fit into the European situation right now. The still existing and growing need of the
European citizens to identify with nations can be interpreted as a result of emerging insecurity
and instability in terms of the interpretation and definition of Europe or the European Union
itself. This insecurity increases with the pluralization of claims that are raised against the
EU by the different member–states. By allowing access to the Union to the Eastern European
countries, a new type of claim arose: that of compensation for the suffering and imposed
economic backwardness in the past. This pure economic and monetary claim does not leave
space for a political integration because the entity itself that raises the claim (i.e. the nation)
would then be weakened. Having members in the union that so clearly only want to gain
economic profits from it also effects the position of the other members because no one wants
to pay the piper. That does not mean that also the “old” members did not draw any economic
profit from the accession of the “new” members. But also the old members started to follow
more inward leading politics that put the nation first and leave to the EU the position of a
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milk cow that everyone wants to milk but not to feed. Against that background workers and
products from other European countries on the own labor or consumermarkets are perceived
as a price that has to be paid for the membership and not as a benefit itself. If there is a real
will to overcome this situation the national politics have to take up much clearer and louder
positions against these nationalistic tendencies. To gain more insights in that topic, future
research should go deeper into the single situations of all the national labor and consumer
markets to help to understand the mechanisms of exclusion that work on the European
markets and to help to develop measures to overcome them.
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